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The paper is designed to provoke discussion of the circumstances 
under which expulsion of aliens from an economy can increase the total 
income of the remaining residents. The presumption, based on a first 
approximation assuming competitive equilibrium and convex constant-returns-
to-scale production technology, is that expulsion cannot increase total 
citizen income and may diminish it, unless it is accompanied by expropria-
tion. How this presumption might be modified or reversed by failure of 
its assumptions is discussed. The most important possibility is that 
aliens held monopolies in high marginal product occupations from which 
qualified or potentially qualified citizens were excluded. Readers are 
invited to speculate about other possibilities, including dynamic effects 
and changes of social psychology, which cannot be analyzed with the 
techniques of static economic theory used here. 
INTRODUCTION. 
When aliens are expelled from a nation, what is the effect on the 
economic welfare of the remaining residents? The question is suggested 
by current and recent events in East Africa. The most spectacular of these 
is General Amin's expulsion of Asians and Europeans from Uganda. A quieter, 
slower, and more humane policy of Africanization continues in Kenya, as 
non-citizens are gradually denied renewal of trade licenses and work permits. 
These policies are explicitly premised, at least in part, on the expectation 
that the economic welfare of African citizens will be improved, certainly 
in the long run if not Immediately. Against this official premise stand 
the dire predictions of some observers and comentators, mostly foreigners, 
that these countries will suffer great economic loss by forcing productive 
members of their economies to depart. 
What can economic theory say about this conflict of analysis 
and prediction? It is too much to expect to answer empirical questions 
without empirical research, which will not be able to provide conclusive 
answers for some time to come if ever. But theory should at least be able 
to offer some guidance for such research, delineating the facts on which 
the answers depend. 
To avoid misunderstanding at the outset I stress two points. 
First, I am not concerned here with the ethics of policies of Africanization, 
either their objectives or the means by which they are pursued. The paper 
concerns only the efficacy of the policies with respect to their stated 
objectives. Second, I am concerned only with the economic objectives and 
motivations of the policies. I recognize that the policies could have, 
doubtless do have, important political and social goals as well. Conceivably 
the majority of East Africans and their leaders would find the gains of 
"controlling our own economy" worth some loss of per capita income and 
consumption, should that price have to be paid. Conceivably improvements 
in the positions of certain native elites might have decisive weight in 
political evaluation of the merits of expulsion, for national as well as 
self-interested reasons. I confine myself to the narrower question, the 
effect on the average per capita income of citizens. 
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A first approximation will serve as a useful point of reference 
for further considerations. It is that expulsion without expropriation 
cannot increase but may well decrease the average income of the remaining 
residents. This answer depends on certain assumptions which it is well 
to put on the table right away; some consequences of possible failure of 
these assumptions will be discussed in later sections. The assumptions 
are: 
a. As already stated, there is no expropriation of the non-human 
properties of the expelled aliens. They are paid full value for properties 
they leave behind, though they are not compensated for the loss of their 
incomes from personal labor and skill, "human capital". 
b. Before and after expulsion the economy is in competitive 
equilibrium, in which factors of production are paid their marginal private 
and social products. 
c. Production is subject to constant returns to scale in the 
economy, and production functions are convex- (That is, if x and x^ are 
any two feasible vectors of inputs and outputs, then any linear combination 
< < of them bx + (l-b)x2 (0 = b = 1) is also feasible). 
d. The output of the economy can be regarded as a single 
homogeneous commodity produced by a large number of inputs. This is a 
convenient, and I think innocuous, simplification. It enables me to define 
income unambiguously and to avoid welfare calculations in terms of utilities. 
I shall sketch two explanation of the first approximation theorem. 
They do not deserve to be dignified as "proofs"; rather they rely on well-
known results proved elsewhere. The first assumes the usual neo-classical 
production function, with continuous positive first derivatives in all inputs. 
The second, which I find more instructive, uses a linear activity analysis 
model of production. Both come to essentially the same result. 
In both approaches the homogeneous output is produced by n inputs. 
The quantity of the ith input initially owned by citizens is c^; the quantity 
initially owned by aliens is a^; of this remains in the country after 
expulsion, while the remainder departs with the aliens (0 = = a.)* 
The price of the ith factor, measured in terms of output, is p^ before 
expulsion and p^ after expulsion. In each case the price of the factor 
is its marginal product. Initially, before expulsion, total output Y is 
this equality is assured by the assumption of constant returns 
to scale, which implies that payment of marginal products to all inputs just 
exhausts output. Of this total Y citizens receive E.p^c^, which I will denote 
as y. After expulsion, total output Y' is Zp!(c.+a!). The income of citizens 
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is I'd! (c.+a!) - Ip.a! , v' for short. The second term in v' is the 1 i I 1 1 J 
compensation annually paid aliens, in the case of no expropriation, 
for the productive properties they left in the country. Note that 
this compensation is paid at the initial prices p^, the earnings of 
these factors of production prior to expulsion. The "first approximation" 
proposition is that y' is at most equal to y. 
A further word about compensation is in order. We do not have 
to imagine a literal annual payment to the former alien owners. More 
likely they will have sold the properties outright and obtained in 
exchange foreign assets previously owned by the citizens or government of 
the country they left. Or that economy will have borrowed abroad the sums 
needed to pay the aliens full capital value. Either way there is an 
increase in the net annual interest burden on the economy payable abroad, 
equal to 
In summary: 
(1) y = Y - Ip.a. = Y - Ep.a! - £p.(a.-a!) J i l ri I l 
(2) y' = Y'- Ep.a!! 
(3) y - y* = /Y - Ep.(a.- a!) 7 - Y' 
— i I — 
The question at issue is the value of y - y* as given in equation (3). 
Pursuing the first approach, assume that Y = F(c+a), where F(x) 
is a convex production function in the n inputs x^, x , ...x , with 
positive continuous first derivatives (marginal products) F^(x). 
Similarly Y' = F(c+a')- The factor prices p^ are F^(c+a)—the marginal 
products when the initial set of inputs is producing Y„ The factor 
prices p^ are F^(c+a')—the marginal products when the post-expulsion set 
of inputs is producing Y'. Now equation (3) can be rewritten: 
(4) y - y« = /F(c+a) - EF.(c+a)(a.-a!) 7 - F(c+a») — i l i — 
The term in brackets is a linear approximation to F(cH-a'), obtained by 
starting with F(c+a) and assuming that all first derivatives at that point 
(marginal products) remain constant as inputs are reduced from 
c. + a. to c. + a! , namely reduced by amounts a.- a!. Calculus students l I I l ' J i i 
will recognize it as a Taylor expansion of F from the point c+a, broken 
off at the terms involving first derivatives. By convexity we know that 
this linear approximation never understates but may overstate the true 
value of F at the second point c+a'. 
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Geometrically, imagine the plane tangent to the production 
surface at c+a. The bracketed expression in (4) is the height of the plane 
in the output dimension, at c+a'. That is, from the point of tangency 
go along the tangent plane towards the origin by the distances a^ -a!^  in 
every input direction, and consider the height of the plane in the output 
dimension at that point. The assertion is that the production function F 
itself, for that same set of inputs, is not above the tangent plane at 
that point. A tangent plane never intersects a convex surface. Tangency 
means that the plane is not below F at some points close to c+a. Suppose 
that it were nonetheless below F at c+a'. Then a line from c+a', F(c+a') 
to c+a, F(c+a) would be above the tangent plane at all intermediate points, 
and a. fortiori above F at those intermediate points close to c+a where F 
is below or on the tangent plane. This violates convexity, which requires 
that if any pair of input-output points are feasible all points on the line 
connecting them are also feasible. 
Two-dimensional illustrations cannot do the situation justice, 
but may be useful. In these illustrations I take a^ to be zero for simplicity. 
Figure la shows F as a strictly convex function of one input and indicates 
how y exceeds y'. Figure lb shows F as a linear constant-returns-to-scale 
function of one input, with y=y'. Figure lc shows how the conclusion y<y' 
requires non-convexity of F. Figure 2 is another attempt of the same kind. 
Here the axes represent two inputs, and the familiar production isoquants 
are shown. The tangency is shown at the initial input point c+a. The new 
input point is c, on a lower isoquant. The production values of isoquants 
can be compared by observing where they cross a common ray from the origin 
Thus if OY is the production value of the original isoquant through point 
c+a, 0Y! is the production value of the isoquant through c. The line 
through c has the same slope as the tangent at c+a; it is a projection 
or isoquant of the tangent plane on to the input plane in the same way that 
the production isoquants are projections of the production surface F. The 
height of the tangent plane at c is also given by the distance from the 
origin at which it crosses the ray from the origin. In Figure 2, with 
strictly convex isoquants, it is clear that at c the tangent plane is 
higher than the production function. If the isoquants were linear their 
heights would be equal. Only if the isoquants were concave (to the origin) 
could the production function exceed the tangent plane. 
As Figure lb illustrates, equality of y and y' occurs, consistent 
with convexity, when there is a proportionate reduction of all inputs. (in 




that point c+a' were on the same ray OY as point c+a. The plane tangent to F 
at c+a is also tangent at every point of F along this ray. If we go down 
the tangent plane along this ray we stay on the production function, and 
y = y'. But if we go in any other direction, we are above the production 
function and y > y'. 
In general we know by constant returns to scale that F(vx) = vF(x) 
for any positive v. Suppose that by some improbable coincidence expulsion 
reduces all inputs in the same proportion so that c.+a! = v(c.+a.) for all i. 1 1 1 1 
Then F(c+a') = vF(c+a), and IF.(c+a)(a.-a!) = (l-v)EF.(c+a)(c.+a.) = (l-v)F(c+a). 1 l i I ' i i 
It follows that the bracketed expression in (<+) is vF(c.+a) and that y - y' 
is zero. 
II 
The alternative approach, leading to essentially the same 
conclusion, is to model production as a set of linear activities or proce-
sses. Each process is subject to constant returns to scale and is characte-
rized by fixed requirements of various inputs per unit of output. Produc-
tion of the homogeneous output can be carried out by any number of the m 
available processes, each one using some or all of the n factors of produc-
tion. A competitive equilibrium is the solution of a linear programming 
problem, maximizing output subject to the constraints imposed by the n 
factor supplies. In the equilibrium some s processes are operated, where 
s cannot exceed either m or n, Correspondingly, s of the factor supply 
const.raints--obviously never more than n or m--will be binding, while 
the remaining n - s factors will be in excess supply. In linear 
programming jargon the selection of s operating processes and s fully 
employed activities is a basis, and the programming problem is to find 
that basis which maximizes total output, given the factor supply constraints. 
Factor prices are marginal productivities, just as in the 
neoclassical approach of section I. The prices of all the surplus factors 
are zero. The prices of the other s factors are found by imputing the 
value of the production of each operating process to the s non-surplus 
inputs used in its operation. They may be found by solving s simultaneous 
break-even equations, one for each process in the basis, for the prices 
of the s factors in the basis. At these factor prices, any process not 
in the solution basis, i.e. any process that is inefficient to use, would 
cost more to operate than it could produce. 
- 6 -
How does the competitive equilibrium, the solution of the linear 
programming problems, change when factor supplies are altered by expulsion? 
There are two possibilities. One is that the solution basis is unchanged. 
This will certainly be the case if expulsion simply scales down all inputs 
proportionately. Constant returns to scale are built into the model. But 
it is also possible that the basis is unchanged even if the relative 
supplies of inputs are changed. Geometrically, the production function 
here consists of plane facets. Each facet corresponds to a different basis, 
as do the boundary lines and points between facets. The tangent or 
"supporting" plane, instead of touching the production surface only along 
one line, the ray from the origin, may coincide with a whole facet. The 
change in factor supplies may not be so great as to move out of this 
facet. In this case, since the basis is uncha nged,factor prices are un-
affected ana y- y'. A two-factor example is diagrammed in Figure 3, which 
has the same general structure as Figure 2. 
The other possibility, of course, is that the equilibrium basis 
is altered. Some processes formerly in operation may drop out, while 
others previously unused become efficient. Some factors initially surplus 
may become binding constraints, while others become unemployed for lack 
of cooperating factors. The dimension of the basis s may rise or fall. 
In any event the following is true: Let the prices p^ correspond to the 
initial basis B for factor supplies c-^+a^, and the prices p^ correspond 
to the post-expulsion basis B' for factor supplies c^+aj. Then if B' is 
different from B, Ip.(c.+a!) exceeds Zp!(c.+a!). Therefore Lp.c. exceeds ' ^l l i I i ^11 
Ep! (c.+a!) - £p!a! That is, y exceeds y'. 
The general proposition is the duality theorem of linear 
programming. The minimum valuation of given factor supplies occurs with 
the prices of that basis which maximizes the objective function (here 
total output) with those factor supplies. The prices of some other basis, 
one which would be the maximizing solution for a different set of factor 
supplies but not for this set, will give a larger valuation of the actually 
given factor supplies.^ 
1. Ties are of course possible. Two or more bases may be solutions 
for a given set of factor supplies. Prices will be indeterminate between 
them, but total output and factor income will be the same whichever basis 
and price system is used. I assume that if the basis and prices that 
prevailed before expulsion continue to be one of the possible solutions, 
even though not the only one, after expulsion they will continue to prevail. 
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Two considerations may add to the common sense appeal of the 
proposition, and of its application to the problem of this paper. One 
way in which B' may differ from B is that some factors that are surplus with 
respect to B' are included in basis B. Their prices In p^ are zero 
but positive in p.. These are likely to be factors which are relatively 
abundant in the B' situation; it is these abundant factors that are generously 
valued if the "wrong" prices—p^ corresponding to B—are used. Another 
difference might be that some processes included In B' are not in B, Such 
processes break even at prices but show losses at prices p^. This means 
that the Incomes of the factors used in them are higher at prices p^, 
There Is another interesting and intuitively reasonable 
implication. The inputs withdrawn by the aliens are in aggregate more 
valuable, anyway not less, at the factor prices that prevail after their 
expulsion. It is not surprising; the factors most heavily reduced in supply 
would be expected to become relatively scarce and high-priced, To see this, 
use in reverse the theorem discussed and employed above: Ep!(c.+a. )=Ep.(c.+a.)„ 
> Jr-j 1 1 1 1 9 
that is: Ep!(c.+a!) + Ep!(a.-a!) = Ep.(c.+a!) + Ep.(a.-a!), But 1 1 ^i I I ri l I I I 
Ep!(c.+a!) = Ep.(c.+a! ) Therefore i l l ^ 1 1 1 
E p!(a.-a!) = Ep.(a.-a!) l l i l l 
III 
Before discussing below the limitations of the first approximation 
argument of sections I and II, I should emphasize what it does not mean. 
Let us assume, realistically I think, that the loss of inputs due to 
expulsion is uneven rather than proportionate, b that aliens were not 
providing the same mixture of inputs as citizens. In the linear analysis of 
section II, let us assume Indeed that the changes of relative factor supplies 
are drastic enough to alter the basis. So the first approximation conclusion 
is the stronger one that aggregate citizen income is lower after expulsion. 
This does not imply that every marginal product, every factor price, declines. 
Some citizens, those who can supply factors formerly provided substantially 
by aliens, will enjoy increases in their incomes. Others, those who supply 
factors complementary to aliens' productive inputs, will suffer losses. 
Convexity implies that in aggregate the complementary effects dominate, 
so the gains are smaller than the losses. But substantial shifts of income 
distribution can certainly occur. 
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If the East African stereotype of aliens as shopkeepers, traders, 
independent professionals or semi-professionals, and small business managers 
is accurate, citizens with these capacities will be in scarce supply after 
expulsion. Their marginal products and earnings will rise. On the other hand, 
citizens whose jobs and productivity depend on having shopkeepers, traders, 
professionals, and managers to assist will suffer. 
In sections I and II, I distinguished between those alien inputs 
which are physically withdrawn from the country and those which remain after 
compensation of former alien owners. What difference does it make how alien 
inputs are divided between these two categories? At one extreme, if all alien 
inputs remained in the country—as would happen if all aliens were simply 
rentiers and absentee landlords—the argument implies that expulsion does not 
alter citizen income: y = y'. Indeed it does not even alter the distribution 
of citizen income. It doesn't matter whether the aliens are resident capitalists 
or non-resident capitalists. 
The other extreme is that all alien inputs are physically withdrawn. 
In this case, where the a! are zero, the first approximation theorem applies and 
tells us that y', equal to Epic. is less than or equal to y, which is E p.c.. 
The same outcome occurs if the a', are non-zero but compensation for them is paid 
at prices pi rather than prices p.. In effect, alien owners are compensated 
at the new prices of the inputs tftey leave behind, rather than the old prices. 
It is as if they retained equity in these properties and were remitted their 
actual earnings under the new conditions. This leaves citizens with the earnings 
of the inputs they originally owned, totallingEpIc., no less and no more. 
Although this principle of compensation might well fee less favorable to aliens 
than payments at the initial prices p., it does not make it possible for citizens 
in aggregate to gain from expulsion. 
We have no way to compare intermediate cases with the two extremes or 
with each other. But realistically it is quite conceivable that citizen losses 
are especially acute when alien inputs are partly immobile and partly mobile. 
The immobile inputs may well be especially complementary to the mobile ones, so 
that the prices of the immobile inputs are especially depressed by expulsion. 
Yet the citizen economy is saddled with a debt for these immobile properties, 
calculated at the pre-expulsion prices. High complementarity of this kind 
seems likely between shops, workshops, and professional equipment and the self-
employed proprietors and professionals who formerly owned and operated them. 
In other words, if the citizen economy had the option of destroying the immobile 
properties without compensating their alien owners rather than preserving and 
operating them while paying full compensation, the former alternative might well 
be chosen. 
But it is time of course to recognize the third alternative, to 
keep the properties without full and fair compensation. Clearly citizens 
can gain by full or partial expropriation of aliens, or of non-residents for 
that matter. In the algebra, E p'. (c.+a!) , with little or no deduction 
for debt to former owners of the a!, may easily exceedEp.c., even though 
the p. are on balance better prices for citizen inputs than1the pi. No one 
ever doubted that expropriation pays, at least in the short run before 
repercussions on foreign investment are felt. Our basic first approximation 




The argument so far was based on the assumption that factor incomes 
are competitively determined, equal to the marginal products of available 
factor supplies. But, it will be asked, what if the aliens had some mono-
polistic market power? 
The first answer is merely an extension of previous arguments. 
If the monopolies were attached to particular immobile properties and sites 
owned by aliens, and if the compensation paid them fully capitalized the 
monopoly incomes, transfer of these properties and sites to citizen owner-
ship and operation cannot increase aggregate citizen income. Of course 
the new owners and managers may not shoulder any or all of the debt burden, 
so that they personally benefit. But other citizens, taxpayers or consumers, 
will suffer correspondingly. Once again the gain, if any, can only come 
from expropriation. 
If expulsion were the occasion for eliminating the monopolies 
associated with these properties, the citizen economy could gain whatever 
deadweight loss had been due to the previous distortion and misallocation. 
But this could presumably have been accomplished without expulsion. Indeed 
one may suspect that monopolistic power will be reinforced by the loss of 
potential competitors. 
Other monopolies may have been attached to the mobile human 
capital or labor skills of the expelled aliens. Suppose that there had 
been artificial restrictions on entry into occupations where aliens were 
heavily represented but qualified citizens were excluded. Excluded citizens 
were forced into lower-paying occupations below their capacities, occupations 
where their marginal products were further depressed by the artificially 
swollen supplies. When the aliens leave, citizens take their slots. Here 
there is a potential gain in citizen income. The loss of alien inputs is 
at least partially compensated by an upgrading of marketable citizen factor 
supplies. 
An extreme example will make the point. Suppose that all aliens 
benefited, so far as their mobile inputs are concerned, from restrictions 
on entry to their occupations. Suppose that exclusion of qualified 
citizens from these high-paid occupations resulted, via a chain of bumpings 
down the ladder, in an actual surplus of general unskilled citizen labor. 
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(Here the linear production model is the relevant one, because it allows 
for the possibility of surpluses of some factors.) The marginal product 
and price of this labor is then zero. Suppose that this unemployment was 
no larger than the number of privileged skilled aliens expelled. After 
expulsion the citizen labor force shuffles up the skill ladder. At every 
rung qualified recruits replace departing aliens or replace other citizens 
who move up to fill higher-level vacancies. There is a new set of citizen 
factor supplies c^, identical to the old factor supplies c^+a^-a^, which 
were distorted by monopolistic restrictions before expulsion. Therefore 
the total output of the economy will be unchanged, but now all of it, 
except the compensation for aliens' immobile inputs 3 belongs to 
citizens. Citizen income gains by Ip^(a.-al). 
The analysis is the same in principle but more complex in detail 
if the restrictions took the form of excluding potentially qualified 
citizens from education and training. For example, maybe citizen children 
capable of acquiring the human capital of aliens were prevented from doing 
so by allocation of school slots to alien children. Presumably then the 
returns on investment in citizen human capital, especially in view of the 
low opportunity cost of diverting young citizens from labor force to schooling, 
exceeded the social interest rate. In the long run the human capital of 
the departing aliens is replaced, and the returns on it all accrue to the 
citizen economy. And these returns, thanks to the sub-optimal level of 
education and training in the first place, exceed the interest costs of 
the investment to the citizen economy. 
Others can judge better than I the realism of these scenarios, 
or of less extreme scenarios with the same qualitative results. They cannot 
be either excluded or accepted a. priori. Were aliens in East Africa in 
fact able to restrict citizen entry and competition in their professions 
and lines of business? Were they in fact able to keep citizens out of 
scarce school slots or to prevent the expansion of educational opportunities 
for citizens? If so, an economist is bound to observe that anti-monopoly 
pro-competitive measures were an alternative to expulsion. Indeed the 
argument of sections I and II suggests that these measures would add more 
to citizen income than expulsion could. Better to retain the aliens and 
their skills, but to pay them only their true competitive marginal products, 
the prices they would command in competition with all qualified citizens. 
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Section IV employed implicitly a specialization of the activity 
analysis model of section II, and it may be worth while to spell it out 
somewhat more precisely. Consider a subset of factors of production, all 
of them varieties of human labor, say inputs l,2,...k. I call it a 
hierarchical subset if the total available qualified supply of input i is 
also included in the total available supply of input i-1, for all i from 2 
to k inclusive. In such a subset, in other words, inputs can be graded 
by skill, and anyone with a certain grade of skill is also qualified for 
all lower grades. In listing factor supplies x^, x^ is the total amount 
of labor of all grades; x^ the amount with skill grade 2 or higher; and 
so on, with x the amount with the highest skill grade k. The technical K 
input-output coefficients for any process must be interpreted analogously. 
Thus is the total amount of labor of the k grades of the subset needed 
to produce a unit of output in process j; a^. is the amount required of 
labor of grade 2 or higher; a . the amount required of grade k. These 
coefficients must be distinguished from the requirement for labor of an 
exact grade; the need for specifically unskilled labor is for example 
. Under this interpretation p^ is not the total wage of workers of 
grade i; it is only the differential of their wage above that of workers 
employed at grade i-1. p^ is the wage of general unskilled labor of lowest 
grade, and the full wage of workers of grade i is ^Pu- A p^ is zero when 
the cumulative supply of workers of at least skill grade i exceeds the demand; 
this means that some workers are employed below their level of qualification 
and receive no differential reward for their higher skill. There can be 
several hierarchical subsets of the full set of inputs, and is general formula-
tion of supplies, input requirements, and prices can be maintained even if 
they overlap, provided they join at or near the bottoms of their pyramids as 
in Figure 4. 
This set-up makes it easy to see how to handle occupational entry 
restrictions within the format of the linear programming model. Simply 
make the supply constraints in the labor grades where such monopolies are 
effective lower than the actual qualified supply. Leave unchanged the 
supply constraints of other grades. The basis of the solution will be 
altered accordingly, generally increasing the p^ —the skill premiums—in 
the sheltered occupations and decreasing the p^ of unsheltered lower-grade 
occupations that suffer from the lack of complementary workers at higher 
grades. This is the sort of model behind the scenarios of section IV. 
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VI 
The assumption of constant returns to scale may not be justified. 
How would the first approximation conclusions have to be modified? On 
the one hand, it might be argued that there are diminishing returns to 
scale in the inputs of labor and reproducible capital because of limited 
supplies of natural resources, for example unimproved land. On these 
grounds diminution in population, even accompanied by a proportionate 
curtailment of capital inputs, could be welcomed because it would raise 
average output per unit of input. I doubt the applicability, or at least 
the importance, of this consideration in East Africa, where population 
density is not high and much land and space are unused. 
On the other hand, the national markets may be so small that 
many economies of scale have yet to be fully exploited. Even though the 
countries engage in international trade, the size of their domestic 
markets is relevant, given the natural obstacles and costs of distance as 
well as tariffs and other governmental barriers to free trade. On this 
score, reduction in the size of the domestic market by expulsion is, other 
things equal, bad for per capita income. Expelled aliens in England and 
India are not a substitute, so far as the size of the market is concerned, 
for aliens in Nairobi and Mombasa and Kampala—a fact reinforced by the 
likelihood that their marginal productivities are lower in their new and 
strange locales. 
Another assumption that might be challenged is the aggregation 
of output into a single homogeneous good in the models analyzed above. 
Departure of aliens probably in fact changes the mix of output, since their 
tastes are not the same as those of citizens. Some may wonder whether aliens' 
high incomes were due to the fact that their inputs were especially well 
adapted to the pre-expulsion final bill of goods and would not be so valuable 
in producing the goods and services favored in a citizen economy. The 
question almost refutes itself. In the extreme, the aliens might have been 
a separate economy, producing for themselves to satisfy their own tastes. 
If so, their departure—regardless of how rich they were—could neither 
help nor harm the separate citizen economy. To the extent that their incomes 
were due to their own tastes, their influence on the rest of the economy 
was neutral. If they earned incomes by selling to citizens, it is because 
their inputs were in some degree adapted to citizen tastes, and their 
withdrawal has the kind of effects already described. 
One could indeed apply a standard two country international trade 
model to the alien and citizen communities and obtain the standard conclusion 
that normally each side gains from trade, or at worst does not lose. The 
extreme possibility that aliens manipulate the terms of trade so as to 
capture all the gains for themselves means that citizens would not lose 
by the termination of the trade when the aliens depart. It does not mean 
that they would gain. Anyway this suspicion is just the question of alien 
monopolies in another guise, a subject already discussed in section IV. 
VII 
Sometimes official economic rationales of policies of Africaniza-
tion, implicit and explicit, seem to be based on an image of the economic 
process quite different from the models discussed above. The image is an 
economy whose aggregate wealth and income are naturally and exogenously 
determined, independently of the effort, skill and saving of the inhabitants. 
Jobs and shops and businesses are just tickets that allow the holders to 
claim shares of these exogenously fixed, though it is hoped growing, amounts 
of wealth and output. The tickets can be reassigned without danger to the 
total, so obviously the lot of citizens can be improved by giving them tickets 
formerly held by aliens. Maybe such an economy is approximated by an oil-
rich sheikdom or by a country whose land effortlessly yields crops for 
export or home consumption or displays scenic beauties greatly prized by 
foreigners. But it is a dangerous model for almost all real countries, and 
a possibly serious consequence of expulsion policies may be that these 
rationales will be believed by the governments that espouse them and the 
people the policies are supposed to benefit. 
Economics and economic theory cannot evaluate that danger, and 
they are equally helpless to appraise an intangible effect of great potential 
importance in the opposite direction. This is the response of the populace 
to national challenge, evoked by the political appeal of economic independence 
and self-sufficiency and even accentuated by the initial hardships and 
disruptions incident to expulsion. (Let us show the world and ourselves 
that we can do it on our own, just as the Egyptians confounded skeptical 
prophecies and operated the Suez canal.) The example of communist China 
shows that nationalistic and patriotic motivations, tinged until fairly 
recently with xenophobia, can support indigenous economic progress. Whether 
the example can be copied in Africa or elsewhere, with or without communism, 
only the future can tell. But the Chinese case suggests one more lesson, 
namely that economic progress occurs after "wars" of economic independence 
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stop and are supplanted by hard work and careful administration, sustained 
by appropriate shift in the party line. In some ways the Great Cultural 
Revolution of the 1960s in China was the moral and political equivalent 
of the policies of expulsion and Africanization in East Africa. It did 
considerable economic damage, but the Chinese leadership knew when to declare 
peace and to shift the emphasis of policy and propaganda from blaming 
economic ills on enemies to extolling hard work and self-reliance. 
